We have added a Google Analytics ID reverse lookup tab: https://intelx.io/tools?tab=analytics
It will redirect to 3rd party sites that look up a Google Analytics ID and show websites that use the same analytics ID for Google Analytics. This can be an indicator that the resulting websites are operated by the same person.
The website WeLeakInfo.com was taken down and seized by the FBI on January 16, 2020. The press release from the US Department of Justice is available here. A news report from The Register mentions two 22-year olds who are allegedly involved.
We have published a blog post diving into the technical infrastructure used by WeLeakInfo.
We have published our second Transparency Report in this blog post. It includes statistics and breakdown on 44 content removal requests, 0 court orders, and 1 government request. The blog post includes the response from our CEO to the request from a US government agency.
We were under a DDoS attack on January 26, 2020. We received 4,935,580 HTTP requests in 3 minutes from the IPs 188.8.131.52 and 184.108.40.206. It was the second DDoS attack – the last one was on September 19, 2019.
The attack had no impact on Intelligence X. For more details read this blog post.
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May 2020: New dorks website, Tor, DDoS test and a Europol takedown Our dataset continues to grow significantly: 17,660,962,195 selectors In the past few months, we have invested in 200+ TB of enterprise storage which allows us to scale up data collection even more. As for the public web, we are currently crawling these TLDs:
On Sunday, May 10, 2020, we will DDoS our own website, intelx.io. We will live tweet and update this blog post with any developments and the outcome. The attack will be executed in the same fashion as an actual attack: we’ll do some research, then pay a shady DDoS provider in Bitcoin (and hope they
Tor .onion domains are the hashes of public keys. Generally, they look random, but it is possible for am Tor hidden service operator to generate onion domains that start with a human readable part such as “silkroad7rn2puhj.onion”. Those are called “vanity onion addresses” and there are tools like Shallot and Eschalot that will create the